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Sterling financial markets
Overview
Heightened investor concern over fiscal situations in a number
of countries was the dominant influence on sterling and
international capital markets.  Trading conditions in some
government bond markets, normally viewed as safe assets,
became impaired prompting increased demand for the most
liquid instruments, including UK, US and German government
bonds.  More generally, realised and option-implied volatilities
picked up sharply in a number of markets as investors
retreated from risk-taking (Chart 1).  In sterling financial
markets, these developments overshadowed the impact of
uncertainty associated with the outcome of the UK general
election.
The euro-area situation was considered sufficiently serious to
prompt Member States to agree an international support
package to stem the risk of contagion and underpin market
liquidity.  The package alleviated some near-term pressures,
but worries persisted and subsequently there were sharp falls
in equities, bank funding costs increased and primary capital
market issuance declined.
Against that background, despite generally positive
macroeconomic data, short to medium-term market interest
rates in the major currencies fell.  This reflected perceptions
that monetary policies in the major economies would remain
accommodative for longer to help support the global
economic recovery.
Recent developments in sterling capital markets
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
In each of the monetary policy meetings during the review
period, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) voted to maintain the stock of asset purchases financed
by central bank reserves at £200 billion and the official
Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%.  Given
the existing stock of purchased assets, together with the low
level of Bank Rate, UK monetary policy remained highly
accommodative.
Towards the end of the review period there was increased
volatility in financial markets following renewed concerns
about European sovereign risk.  These heightened concerns
were evident to some degree in activity in the Bank’s
operations.  Although there were no asset purchases financed
by central bank reserves, the Bank continued to purchase
sterling commercial paper (CP) and operate as a buyer and
seller in the sterling corporate bond market, with net
purchases financed by the issuance of Treasury bills.  When
market conditions deteriorated in May, demand to issue CP to
the Bank increased (Chart 2).  After the end of the review
period, the Bank’s corporate bond auction on 25 May also saw
increased appetite to sell to the Bank.  In addition, demand to
borrow from the Bank via its three-month long-term repo
operation increased notably on 18 May (see pages 86–89 for
more details).
This article reviews developments in sterling financial markets since the 2010 Q1 Quarterly Bulletin
up to 21 May 2010.  The article also reviews the Bank’s official operations.
Markets and operations
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Previous Bulletin 
Sources:  Barclays Capital, Bloomberg, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Thomson Reuters Datastream and
Bank calculations.
(a) Simple average of the VIX, VFTSE and VSTOXX equity volatility indices.
(b) Simple average of implied volatilities from three-month options on sterling-US dollar,
euro-US dollar and euro-sterling exchange rates.
(c) Simple average of implied volatilities on US, European and UK swaptions settling on ten-year
swap rates, one year forward.
(d) Simple average of one to four-month implied volatilities from options on the five-year
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Looking ahead, market participants continued to expect
UK monetary policy rates to remain low for some time.
Expectations for Bank Rate for the end of 2011 and 2012, as
implied by forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates, fell
further as concerns about euro-area fiscal issues were
perceived to delay wider economic recovery (Chart 3).  There
were similar falls in euro and US dollar OIS rates.
Market participants may also have become more uncertain
about the outlook for Bank Rate, however.  Information from
options on sterling short-term interest rate futures indicated
that implied volatility rose, largely reversing falls earlier in the
year (Chart 4).  That could have reflected a general increase in
uncertainty about the global macroeconomic outlook.  But it
may also have been related to UK consumer price inflation
outturns for March and April, which were higher than market
participants had expected.  Alternatively, or in addition, since
these options settle on Libor (rather than OIS rates), the
increase in implied volatility could have reflected uncertainty
about risk premia embedded in Libor, rather than around
expected future policy rates.
Libor-OIS spreads widened somewhat in sterling and other
currencies (Chart 5).  There was a more pronounced widening
in forward spreads suggesting that market participants
perceived that bank funding costs might increase further in the
months ahead.  Nevertheless, implied forward Libor-OIS
spreads remained well below the levels of late 2008, in part
because the significant injection of central bank liquidity
during 2009 and early 2010 had reduced bank demand for
short-maturity funding.
One reason reported by contacts for the widening in Libor-OIS
spreads was increased concern about the possible implications
for banks of sovereign default risks.  In particular, there were
worries that banks would suffer losses on their holdings of
European government securities, especially those issued by
Greece, Portugal and Spain.  European banks’ credit default
swap (CDS) premia increased sharply, especially for Greek and
Portuguese banks (Chart 6).
Accompanying higher short-term domestic funding costs for
banks, there were also renewed signs of stress in
cross-currency funding markets.  This was especially visible in
the market for US dollar funding, with an increase in the
implied cost of borrowing sterling, Swiss francs or euros and
swapping into US dollars via the foreign exchange spot and
forward markets (Chart 7).  The increase in cost was less than
during earlier episodes of distress, such as following the failure
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Sterling corporate bonds (ﬁnanced by bank reserves)(a)
Sterling corporate bonds (ﬁnanced by Treasury bill issuance)(b)
Sterling commercial paper (ﬁnanced by bank reserves)(a)




(a) Holdings financed by a loan from the Bank of England to the Asset Purchase Facility Fund
which itself is financed by bank reserves held at the Bank of England.
(b) Holdings financed by a loan from the Debt Management Office to the Asset Purchase Facility
Fund which itself is financed by UK Treasury bill issuance.




















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s sterling OIS curve.
Chart 3 Sterling instantaneous forward interest rates





















Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
Chart 4 Sterling short-term interest rate implied
volatilitybe because European banks had a lower amount of US dollar
assets to fund than previously, given asset sales and balance
sheet restructuring.  It might also reflect the effect of official
support mechanisms that were in place.
The deterioration in US dollar funding markets prompted the
reintroduction of arrangements between the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and other central banks(1) (including the
Bank of England) to offer US dollars to their domestic
counterparties.  There was no use of this facility via the Bank,
but contacts noted that it acted as a backstop source of
US dollar funding.
Government bond markets
Against the backdrop of increased investor concerns about
fiscal sustainability in some European countries, government
bond markets, including the gilt market, experienced sharp
price changes.  Spreads between yields on certain countries’
government bonds and German bunds widened sharply
(Chart 8) and sovereign CDS premia increased (Chart 9).
As discussed in the box on page 81, part of the increase in
sovereign CDS premia might be related to the hedging activity
of so-called counterparty valuation adjustment desks.
Relatedly, market functioning in a number of bond markets
became impaired.  In particular, bid-offer spreads for
government bonds of some euro-area countries rose sharply
relative to those in UK and German government bond markets
(Chart 10).
In response to these developments, on 11 April euro-area
Member States agreed to a three-year loan facility for Greece.
This was followed by a broader official support package.  On
2 May, the EU and IMF agreed to provide emergency loans to
Greece worth €110 billion and the European Central Bank
(ECB) suspended its minimum credit rating criteria for Greek
government debt allowable as collateral in its operations.  On
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings.
(b) Three-month, three-month forward Libor-OIS spreads derived from forward rate agreements.
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Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior CDS prices.
(b) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(c) Average of Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and
Morgan Stanley.
(d) Average of BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale and
UBS.




















Sources:  British Bankers’ Association, Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of three-month US dollar Libor implied from foreign exchange forwards over actual
three-month US dollar Libor.  For more details on the construction of these measures see
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 2, page 134, Chart 26 and BIS Quarterly
Review, March 2008, pages 73–86.
Chart 7 Spread of foreign exchange implied cost of
three-month US dollar funding over US dollar Libor(a)
(1) Specifically the ECB, Bank of England, Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada and
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Counterparty valuation adjustment desks
Increased use of derivatives by financial institutions during the
past couple of decades, together with a general consolidation
of the international banking system has led to a structural
reorganisation in the way large banks manage counterparty
risk.  Specifically, many banks have set up specialist trading
units to measure and hedge counterparty credit risk, known as
counterparty valuation adjustment (CVA) desks.  This box
explains the activities of CVA desks and how they may
influence financial markets;  particularly the market for credit
default swaps (CDS).
The role of CVA desks
A commercial bank’s CVA desk centralises the institution’s
control of counterparty risks by managing counterparty
exposures incurred by other parts of the bank.  For example, a
CVA desk typically manages the counterparty risk resulting
from a derivative transaction with another financial institution
(such as entering an interest rate swap agreement).
The main role of the CVA desk is to consolidate credit risk
management within the company.  This can improve risk
control procedures, including taking account of any offsetting
positions with the same counterparty (which can reduce the
need to hedge).  CVA desks will charge a fee for managing
these risks to the trading desk, which then typically tries to
pass this on to the counterparty through the terms and
conditions of the trading contract.  But CVA desks are not
typically mandated to maximise profits, focusing instead on
risk management.
CVA desks’ hedging of derivatives exposures
In a derivative transaction, a bank may incur a loss if its
counterparty defaults.  Specifically, if the bank’s derivative
position has a positive marked-to-market (MTM) value
(calculated for the remaining life of the trade) when the
counterparty defaults this is the bank’s ‘expected positive
exposure’.  These potential losses are asymmetric.  If the value
of a bank’s derivative position increases (ie the bank is likely to
be owed money by its counterparty), the potential loss in the
event of default of the counterparty will rise.  In contrast, if the
value of the bank’s derivative position falls such that it is more
likely to owe its counterparty when the contract matures then
the potential loss on the transaction is zero.
Having aggregated the risks, CVA desks often buy CDS
contracts to gain protection against counterparty default.  If
liquid CDS contracts are not available for a particular
counterparty, the desk may enter into an approximate hedge
by purchasing credit protection via a CDS index and increase
the fee charged to the trading desk to reflect the imperfect
nature of the hedge.  On occasion, when CDS contracts do not
exist, CVA desks may try to short sell securities issued by the
counterparty (ie borrow and then sell the securities) but this
is rare.
Another way to mitigate counterparty risk is for parties to a
derivative trade to exchange collateral when there are changes
in the MTM value of the derivative contract.  The terms of the
collateral agreements between the counterparties (detailed in
the credit support annex in the derivative documentation)
include details such as frequency of remargining.  Since MTM
exposure for the bank is greatest if counterparties do not post
collateral, CVA desks have reportedly been influential in
promoting better risk management via tighter collateral
agreements in order to reduce the CVA charge.
CVA activity and the sovereign CDS market
Against the background of heightened investor awareness of
sovereign risk, the cost to insure against default on
government bonds through CDS has risen recently.  According
to contacts, increased hedging by CVA desks has been an
influential factor behind these moves.
Specifically, CVA desks of banks with large uncollateralised
foreign exchange and interest rate swap positions with
supranational or sovereign counterparties have reportedly
been actively hedging those positions in sovereign CDS
markets.  For example, for dealers that have agreed to pay
euros to counterparties and receive dollars, a depreciation in
the euro will result in a MTM profit and hence a counterparty
exposure that needs to be managed.  As explained in the box
on pages 8–9 of the ‘Markets and operations’ article in the
2010 Q1 Quarterly Bulletin, given the relative illiquidity of
sovereign CDS markets a sharp increase in demand from active
investors can bid up the cost of sovereign CDS protection.
CVA desks have come to account for a large proportion of
trading in the sovereign CDS market and so their hedging
activity has reportedly been a factor pushing prices away from
levels solely reflecting the underlying probability of sovereign
default.82 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
10 May this was extended to an emergency funding facility of
€720 billion available to all euro-area countries, and the ECB
announced that it would intervene in euro-area public and
private debt securities markets to ‘ensure depth and liquidity
in those market segments which are dysfunctional’.
Given the large projected UK fiscal deficit position, some
commentators had anticipated that gilt yields would also be
pushed higher as general concerns about sovereign debt
sustainability rose.  For much of the period, these concerns
may have been exacerbated by uncertainty about the eventual
outcome of the UK general election in May.  In particular,
survey polls indicated a reduced probability of a single-party
government — reportedly seen as relevant to the
UK government taking decisive action to tackle the fiscal
deficit.
In fact the prices of gilts, as well as those of US and German
government bonds, rose and their yields fell.  Contacts
suggested that investors sought refuge away from government
bonds that they perceived to be riskier.  Overall, the gilt yield
curve shifted lower, with similar moves being observed for
US Treasuries and French and German government bonds
(Chart 11).  The spread between gilt and bund yields was little
changed (Chart 12).
These so-called ‘safe haven’ flows into gilts might have been
expected to reduce gilt yields relative to other benchmark
sterling interest rates.  However, the spread between gilt yields




















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spreads over ten-year German government bond yields.
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Previous Bulletin
Source:  Tradeweb.
(a) Bid-offer spreads on ten-year government bonds.
(b) Bonds issued by the following euro-area countries:  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
















Dashed lines:  19 February 2010
Solid lines:  21 May 2010
Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by Germany and France.
Chart 11 International nominal government bond yield
curves(a)
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Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) From five-year CDS prices.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 83
respond to changes in liquidity premia in gilt yields, narrowed
only slightly (Chart 12).
A possible explanation for lower medium-horizon OIS rates is
that market participants revised down their expectations for
future monetary policy rates, perhaps reflecting concerns
about the impact of the anticipated fiscal consolidation on
economic growth.  Consistent with that, and despite the
large projected UK government debt position, sterling
medium-term real rates remained low compared with their
historical levels.  Indeed, the rise in sterling five-year, five-year
forward real interest rates observed in the previous review
period was partly unwound (Chart 13).  Furthermore, at
ultra-long horizons, continued pension fund demand for
index-linked gilts — in order to match better their liabilities —
reportedly contributed in keeping real yields close to their
historical lows.
During the review period, medium-term measures of sterling
forward inflation rates remained broadly unchanged, although
they generally fell during April and May (Chart 13).  In
principle, these moves may reflect changes in investors’
expectations about future inflation and/or their required
compensation for uncertainty around future inflation.
However, contacts reported that sterling index-linked gilts did
not benefit from increased investor demand to the same
degree as conventional gilts.  That would have had the effect
of lowering measured forward inflation rates.  An alternative
indicator of longer-term expected future inflation is provided
by surveys, which on the whole remained broadly stable
(Chart 13).
Uncertainty about future inflation might be reflected in the
prices of options that pay out if nominal interest rates (which
encompass compensation for future inflation) rise significantly.
Indeed, the skew of the implied distribution of future
long-term interest rates, as derived from swaption prices,
remained elevated compared with levels in 2008 (Chart 14).
Foreign exchange
Overall, the sterling effective exchange rate (ERI) ended the
period little changed, although this masked contrasting moves
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Nominal sterling ten-year spot rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
(b) Based on ten-year benchmark government bond yields.

















RPI inﬂation (derived from inﬂation swaps)(b)




Sources:  Bank of England, Consensus Economics and YouGov/Citigroup.
(a) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
(b) Derived from the Bank’s inflation swap curve.
(c) YouGov/Citigroup survey results of long-term public inflation expectations for five to ten
years ahead.
(d) Consensus Economics survey results of economists’ expectations for RPIX inflation.
Chart 13 Sterling five-year real interest rates and
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Source:  Barclays Capital.
(a) Skews of five-year, five-year sterling forward payer swaptions.  The so-called payer skew is
the difference between the implied volatility of an out-of-the-money (in this case 200 basis
points above the prevailing five-year, five-year sterling forward rate) swaption and the
implied volatility of an at-the-money swaption.  It captures the relative cost of upside
protection against higher medium-term nominal interest rates.
Chart 14 Sterling long-term interest rate skew(a)84 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
the moves in currency markets over the period were in large
part attributable to renewed concerns about the fiscal
position of some European countries.  This led to a sharp
depreciation of the euro and a general appreciation of the
US dollar.
Contacts suggested that the pound benefited from a general
retreat from euro-area assets, but UK-specific risks were also
reported to be a concern for investors.  In particular,
heightened uncertainty about the outcome of the UK general
election in early May might have boosted risk premia on
sterling assets.
The relative balance of probabilities attached to future large
upward or downward moves in the value of sterling against the
euro (as inferred from option prices) ended the period broadly
unchanged.  But it became more negative for the prospective
value of sterling against the US dollar (Chart 16).  This implied
that market participants were prepared to pay more to protect
themselves against a future depreciation of sterling against the
US dollar than against an appreciation.  US dollar-sterling
implied volatility also remained high, reflecting increased
uncertainty about the future rate of exchange.
Equity markets 
UK equity indices moved broadly in line with other major
equity indices over recent months (Chart 17).  In particular,
global equity prices increased in the first half of the period,
resuming the general upward trend in share prices that began
in March 2009.  However, they subsequently declined sharply
in April and May, to end the period slightly lower.
According to contacts, the decline in global equity markets
was triggered by the generalised rise in risk aversion and
increased investor concerns about long-term economic growth
prospects for countries requiring significant fiscal adjustment.
The prospects of increased financial sector regulation in both
the United States and Europe also contributed to falls in equity
prices in the latter part of the review period.
Consistent with heightened risk aversion, implied equity
volatilities derived from options for the FTSE 100 picked up
sharply in May, having drifted lower earlier in the quarter.
Likewise, the skew of the distribution of future equity prices
implied from options prices became more negative, indicating
that investors perceived that the balance of risks shifted
further to the downside.  Taken together, these moves
suggested that the weight investors attached to the possibility
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Chart 15 Cumulative changes in sterling ERI and
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Sources:  British Bankers’ Association, ICAP and Bank calculations.
(a) Returns are defined as the logarithmic difference between the current forward rate and the
spot rate at the maturity date of the contract.
(b) The simplified sterling ERI places 70% weight on the euro-sterling bilateral exchange rate and
30% weight on US dollar-sterling bilateral exchange rate.
Chart 16 Three-month option-implied skewness of
foreign exchange returns(a)
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Indices are quoted in domestic currency terms, except for the MSCI Emerging Markets Index,
which is quoted in US dollar terms.
(b) The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
performance of stocks in emerging markets.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 85
Nonetheless, the implied (risk-neutral) probability of a large
fall in equity prices remained lower than levels reached in
late 2008.  Moreover, looking over a longer time window,
equity prices remained well above their levels in March 2009,
consistent with a recovery in future corporate profits.  Indeed,
on the back of generally stronger-than-expected UK company
earnings for the first quarter, the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (IBES) survey of investment analysts
continued to point to upward revisions to company earnings
expectations compared with earlier in the year (Chart 19).
However, dividend swap prices — a market-based measure
which embodies investor perceptions for future corporate
earnings — for the FTSE 100 moved slightly lower over the
quarter (Chart 20).  Implied dividends on the Euro Stoxx 50
fell by substantially more (despite similarly positive European
corporate earnings news).  In principle, these falls in dividend
swap prices might indicate that investors revised down their
expectations for future corporate payouts, especially at longer
horizons.  But market contacts suggested that the moves were
more likely driven by increases in the required compensation
for uncertainty around future dividends linked to the general
retrenchment from risky assets.
Corporate credit markets
Alongside the increase in short-term funding costs for banks,
the spread between yields on sterling and euro-denominated
corporate bonds issued by financial companies and
similar-maturity government bond yields widened (Chart 21).
And senior debt issuance by UK banks was low relative to the
amount contacts suggested might be needed to replace
government-sponsored schemes due to expire over the next
couple of years (Chart 22).  Contacts thought that this partly
reflected the recent general deterioration in market
conditions.
Outside the financial sector, movements in corporate bond
spreads were more muted although the cost of insuring
against non-financial corporate bond default via credit default
swaps edged up further.
Primary issuance by UK non-financial corporates also fell,
particularly in May.  While cumulative bond issuance in the
first five months of 2010 remained well below the record 2009
levels, it was broadly in line with the average between 2005
and 2008 (Chart 23).
To the extent that increased volatility across financial markets
discouraged investors from making primary market bond
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Sources:  Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. 
(a) IBES uses consensus forecasts of earnings per share by sell-side analysts.
(b) Data refer to earnings per share on the FTSE All-Share index.  Forecasts are denoted by
dashed lines, and outturns are denoted by the solid line.
(c) The figures for a specific year relate to companies’ annual results that have a year end
between start-June of that year and end-May of the following year.
(d) Refers to forecast data available at the data cut-off for each Bulletin.
Chart 19 Actual and IBES forecasts for earnings per share
for the FTSE All-Share index(a)(b)(c)
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) From exchange-traded futures contracts.
(b) For more details on dividend swaps, see the box ‘Dividend swaps’, in the Bank of England













Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) Calculated from the risk-neutral distribution of returns from three-month option prices.
Chart 18 FTSE 100 option-implied probability of a
20% fall(a)86 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
companies were forced to hold back some of their planned
2010 issuance.  But lower issuance may also be the result of
corporates having pre-emptively issued some of their 2010
planned funding in 2009, in a bid to pay off outstanding bank
debts and extend the maturity of their debt.
Bank of England operations
The size of the Bank’s balance sheet was little changed since
the previous Bulletin, following a period of rapid expansion.(1)
The balance sheet increased from £247 billion at the end of the
previous review period to £251 billion at the end of the current
review period, which principally reflected a small increase in
the stock of long-term repo open market operations (OMOs).
The remainder of this section describes in more detail the
Bank’s operations over the review period.
Asset purchases(2)
In the week prior to the February 2010 MPC meeting, the Bank
met the target set by the MPC of purchasing £200 billion of
public and private sector assets, financed by the issuance of
central bank reserves, via its Asset Purchase Facility (APF).(3)
At each of the monetary policy meetings during the review
period, the MPC voted to maintain the stock of asset
purchases financed by the creation of central bank reserves at
£200 billion.  Consequently, the Bank did not undertake any
APF gilt purchases over the review period.
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the Debt Management Office’s
(DMO) cash management operations continued, in line with
the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009.  Table A
summarises operations under the APF over the review period
by type of asset.
Gilts
The stock of gilts held by the APF in terms of the amount paid
to sellers was maintained at £198.3 billion (Chart 24).(4)
Gilt lending facility
The Bank continued to offer to lend some of its gilt holdings
via the DMO in return for other UK government collateral.  In
the three months to 31 March 2010 a daily average of
£4.1 billion was lent in this way.  Use of the facility continued
to be generally concentrated in gilts in which the Bank holds a
large proportion of the free float (the total amount of a gilt in
issue less the amount held by the UK Government).
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Sources:  Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Option-adjusted spreads.














(a) Issuance with a value greater than US$500 million equivalent and original maturity greater
than one year.










Jan. Mar. May July Sep. Nov.
US$ billions
2009
Average of 2005–08 
2010
Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
Chart 23 Cumulative gross bond issuance by UK
private non-financial corporations
(1) For further details on the structure and evolution of the Bank’s balance sheet, see ‘The
Bank’s balance sheet during the crisis’, in the 2010 Q1 Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, pages 34–42.
(2) The data cut-off for this subsection is 20 May.
(3) The objectives and operation of the APF are described in more detail in the 2009 Q2
Quarterly Bulletin.
(4) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 87
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
During the review period, the majority of primary spreads in
the sterling CP market remained below the spreads at which
the APF offers to purchase CP.  Hence APF holdings of CP
continued to fall from £279 million on 18 February 2010 to
£251 million as of 20 May 2010.  Gross purchases over the
period were £671 million, compared with redemptions of
£700 million.  This occurred alongside a further reduction in CP
outstanding for UK corporate and non-bank financial firms,
which fell from £2.9 billion to £2.4 billion (Chart 25) as
issuers continued to raise longer-term issuance in the
corporate bond market and issue CP in other currencies.
Corporate bonds
The Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell corporate
bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme
during the review period.  The Scheme aims to facilitate
market-making by banks and dealers to help reduce illiquidity
Table A APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
Purchases Sales
18 February 2010(c)(d) 279 198,275 1,467 200,009
25 February 2010 25 0 3 1 27
4 March 2010 50 0 0 6 44
11 March 2010 25 0 2 67 -40
18 March 2010 0 0 5 43 -38
25 March 2010 70 0 15 4 81
1 April 2010 0 0 14 2 12
8 April 2010 0 0 20 0 20
15 April 2010 1 0 0 2 -1
22 April 2010 150 0 0 17 133
29 April 2010 0 0 0 1 -1
6 May 2010 100 0 27 1 126
13 May 2010 0 0 5 0 5
20 May 2010 250 0 12 4 258
Total financed by Treasury bills(d)(e) 251 – 109 360
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) – 198,275 1,310 199,585
Total asset purchases(d)(e) 251 198,275 1,419 199,945
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Amount outstanding as at 18 February 2010.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.
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Sources:  CP Ware and Bank calculations.
Chart 25 Sterling commercial paper outstanding for
UK corporates and non-bank financial firms88 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
premia and so remove obstacles to corporates’ access to
capital markets.
Activity in the Bank’s auctions continued to vary with market
conditions.  Periods of market stress have tended to
correspond with increased activity in the Bank’s purchase
auctions.  This was noticeable on 2 October 2009 when the
Bank received £332 million offers in one operation.  More
recently — though outside of the review period — on 25 May,
and coinciding with a period of broad-based market
uncertainty, the Bank received the third highest number of
offers in a single auction (£276 million).  Similar, if less marked,
increases in activity occurred during the review period, notably
in late April.
Demand in the Bank’s sale auctions tended to coincide with
improvements in investor sentiment, as seen in the first three
weeks of March, during which the Bank sold £114 million of its
portfolio (Chart 26).  But the subsequent deterioration in
market conditions, including a reduction in investor risk
appetite, coincided with periods of decreased activity in the
Bank’s sale auctions, notably in April.
As of 20 May 2010, the Bank portfolio totalled £1,419 million,
compared to £1,467 million at the end of the previous review
period on 18 February 2010.  This fall reflected the effect of
corporate bond sales.
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(1) There has been no
use of the facility to date.
Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) from the secondary
market, but stands ready to do so should conditions in that
market deteriorate.  The UK Government’s 2008 CGS closed
for new issuance on 28 February 2010, although institutions
are able to refinance existing debt guaranteed by the Scheme.
Operations within the sterling monetary framework(2)
The Bank implements monetary policy by maintaining
overnight market interest rates in line with Bank Rate, so that
there is a flat risk-free money market yield curve to the next
MPC decision date and by conducting asset purchases as
mandated by the MPC.
During the period under review, the level of reserves was
determined by (i) the stock of reserves injected via asset
purchases, (ii) the level of reserves supplied by long-term repo
OMOs, and (iii) the net impact of other sterling (‘autonomous
factor’) flows across the Bank’s balance sheet.
Long-term repo OMOs
Over the review period, the three-month extended-collateral
long-term repo OMOs in March and April were uncovered.  But
the operation on 18 May received cover of 1.25 in the wake of
the widespread deterioration in financial market conditions
(Table B).  This resulted in a small increase in the stock of
long-term repo OMOs outstanding over the period.
Monthly repo operations at six, nine and twelve-month
maturities were offered against collateral routinely accepted in
the Bank’s short-term OMOs and Operational Standing
Facilities.  In contrast to repo operations at the three-month
maturity, all of these operations were covered (Table C).  The
Bank announced the introduction of a new operational design
for its long-term repo OMOs in a Market Notice published on
26 May.  The box on pages 90–91 outlines the key features of
the new framework, the first operation under which will take
place on 15 June 2010.(3)
Operational Standing Facilities
As a result of the change to remunerate all reserves balances
at Bank Rate and (given the level of Bank Rate) the reduction
in the rate paid on the Operational Standing Deposit Facility to
zero, average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each
of the maintenance periods under review.  Average use of the

























Purchases proceeds(b) (left-hand scale)
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Number of bonds purchased (right-hand scale) 
Number of bonds sold (right-hand scale)
2009 10
Number of bonds £ millions
(a) Data start on 26 March 2010.
(b) Weekly (Friday–Thursday) amounts in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a
trade-day basis.
(c) Weekly (Friday–Thursday) amounts in terms of value at time of initial purchase, on a
trade-day basis.
Chart 26 Weekly transactions of sterling corporate
bonds(a)
(1) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.
(2) This and the subsection describing other market operations cover operations from
19 February to 21 May.
(3) For further details see www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice100526.pdf.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 89
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) is a permanent facility to
provide liquidity insurance to the banking system and allows
eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts against a
wide range of collateral.  On 6 April 2010, the Bank announced
that the average daily amount outstanding in the DWF
between 1 October and 31 December 2009 was £0 million.
Other market operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The drawdown period for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
closed on 30 January 2009.  Although the drawdown window
to access the SLS has closed, the Scheme will remain in place
for three years, thereby providing participating institutions
with continuing liquidity support.
As at 28 February 2010, securities with a fair value of
£229 billion (2009:  £245 billion) were held as collateral for
Treasury bills lent under the SLS with a face value of
£165 billion (2009:  £185 billion).
US dollar repo operations
In response to the renewed strains in the short-term funding
market for raising US dollars, the Bank, in concert with other
central banks, reintroduced measures to offer US dollar
financing to financial institutions, funded by a swap with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  From 11 May, the Bank
offered weekly fixed-rate tenders with a seven to eight-day
maturity.  As of 21 May, there had been no use of the facility.
Foreign exchange reserves
In March, the Bank issued a $2 billion three-year bond and
purchased the equivalent value of principally euro and
US dollar-denominated assets with the proceeds.  This was the
fourth bond issued by the Bank under the annual bond
issuance programme.
The new bond was announced on 2 March and priced on
8 March.  The transaction, which was marketed via Barclays
Capital, BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs International and
JPMorgan Chase & Co., priced at a spread of zero to
mid-swaps.  The issue was successful, attracting a broad order
book, with orders totalling $2.9 billion.  It sold to investors in
Asia (43%), Africa, Europe and the Middle East (36%) and the
Americas (21%).  As with earlier issues in the programme,
central banks and official institutions were the predominant
buyers (56%), with bonds being sold to asset managers (24%),
and the remainder sold principally to commercial banks,
insurance and pension funds (20%).
At the end of April the Bank’s foreign exchange reserves
comprised £3.9 billion of assets.
Capital portfolio
The Bank regularly purchases sterling bonds in the course of
investing its capital and the proceeds of cash ratio deposits.
These transactions are separate from the purchases of sterling
bonds conducted under the APF.  Over the period from
19 February to 21 May 2010, gilt purchases were made in
accordance with the quarterly announcements on 4 January
and 1 April.  The portfolio currently includes around
£3.6 billion of gilts and £0.6 billion of other debt securities.
Table B Extended-collateral three-month long-term repo
operations
16 March 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.84
Weighted average rate(a) 0.557
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.06
13 April 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 0.41
Weighted average rate(a) 0.500
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.00
18 May 2010
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Cover 1.25
Weighted average rate(a) 0.668
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.500
Tail(b) 0.17
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in percentage points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate
and the lowest accepted rate.
Table C Long-term repo operations
Six-month Nine-month Twelve-month
16 March 2010
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.33 2.88 3.25
Weighted average rate(a) 0.539 0.577 0.685
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.530 0.573 0.673
Tail(b) 0.01 0.00 0.01
13 April 2010
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 2.10 2.19 2.38
Weighted average rate(a) 0.541 0.582 0.689
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.531 0.566 0.686
Tail(b) 0.01 0.02 0.00
18 May 2010
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 1.10 2.88 3.63
Weighted average rate(a) 0.518 0.591 0.640
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.511 0.577 0.640
Tail(b) 0.01 0.01 0.00
(a) Per cent.
(b) The yield tail measures, in percentage points, the difference between the weighted average accepted rate
and the lowest accepted rate.90 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
The Bank’s new indexed long-term repo
operations
In October 2008 the Bank published a wide-ranging
consultation paper on recent and proposed developments in
its sterling market operations.(1) One of the proposals was to
revise its long-term repo operations;  specifically, to widen
permanently the range of collateral eligible in these operations
and to modify the auction design so that the quantity of funds
lent against different types of collateral varied depending on
the rates bid by counterparties in the auction.
Following two periods of consultation with market
participants, the first auction under the revised structure is due
to take place on 15 June 2010.  This box explains briefly the
principles underpinning the new approach and how the
auctions will work in practice.
Background
As part of its existing framework of operations, the Bank has
provided liquidity to the banking system via regular long-term
repo operations (at three, six, nine and twelve-month
maturities) since January 2006.
In addition to influencing the quantity of central bank reserves
as part of the Bank’s implementation of monetary policy,
long-term repos can provide liquidity support to the banking
system in times of stress.  This latter role became particularly
important at the height of the financial crisis, during which the
Bank increased the size and frequency of its three-month
operations and extended temporarily the range of assets that
were eligible to be used as collateral in the operations.  This
helped meet the greater need for central bank liquidity during
the global crisis and helped banks to refinance certain
securities that had become illiquid.  The Bank has continued to
conduct auctions against an extended range of collateral in its
three-month operations alongside its regular long-term repos,
although it gradually decreased the size of the
extended-collateral operations as bidding in these auctions
reduced.
From June onwards, all of the Bank’s long-term repo operations
will be conducted using a revised auction design.  The new
design will allow the proportion of lending against different
types of eligible collateral to adjust automatically in each
auction depending on the bids in that auction, while ensuring
that the liquidity insurance provided is appropriately priced to
avoid distorting banks’ incentives for prudent liquidity
management.  The new-style auctions, and so the provision of
‘liquidity insurance’ via lending against a broader range of
collateral, will be a permanent part of the Bank’s framework
for its sterling operations.
Separately, the Bank is also mindful of the need to control the
risks taken onto its own balance sheet.  The article on
pages 94–103 of this Bulletin sets out how the Bank
undertakes collateral risk management in light of the
expanded range of collateral accepted in these, and other,
operations.
Auction design(2)
The new operations allow participants to borrow against two
distinct ‘sets’ of collateral — one set that corresponds with
securities eligible in the Bank’s short-term repo operations
(‘narrow collateral’) and a second set containing a broader
class of high-quality third-party debt securities that, in the
Bank’s judgement, usually trade in liquid markets (‘wider
collateral’).(3) The Bank has opted for an auction design in
which the total amount of lending on offer in each auction will
be fixed in advance, but the split of lending against each
collateral set will be determined as part of the auction.
Counterparties will be able to bid for funds against either or
both collateral sets.  One could think of bids against each
collateral set as separate, with bids against each type of
collateral ranked from the highest interest rate bid downwards.
Starting with the highest bid, each can be accepted in turn
until a ‘clearing rate’ is reached at which either all the bids are
allotted or the funds allocated to lending against that
collateral set are exhausted.  Hence there will be a clearing
rate for each collateral set.
Assuming reasonable participation in the auctions, there would
be many different ways in which the funds available in the
auction could be split between the two collateral sets.  And
each of these possible allocations would imply a pair of
clearing rates.  So the available allocation choices — effectively
an allocation frontier or ‘demand schedule’ — can be defined
in terms of the spread between pairs of clearing rates.  This
schedule will be downward sloping, as shown in Chart A,
because increasing the share of the auction allocated to wider
collateral will either reduce the clearing rate on wider
collateral or increase the clearing rate on narrow collateral.
Moreover, if market conditions deteriorate, the value attached
to borrowing against wider collateral, relative to borrowing
against narrow collateral, may rise which would increase the
slope of the demand schedule, as shown in Chart A.
The actual allocation will depend on the Bank’s preferences for
allocating funds between collateral sets, as defined by the
spread between the respective clearing rates.  The Bank will
operate on the basis that it requires a larger spread between
clearing rates to increase the proportion of the auction
allocated to the wider collateral set, so the Bank’s ‘supply
schedule’ is upward sloping.  The Bank does not intend to
publish the details of its supply schedule, which need not be
linear but is shown as such for simplicity in Chart A.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 91
The intersection of the Bank’s supply schedule with the
revealed demand schedule from the auction will identify the
collateral split and the clearing rates.  Hence higher bids
against wider collateral relative to narrow collateral would
tend to result in a higher percentage of the auction being
allocated to wider collateral.
This example shows how the new auctions will automatically
react to changes in the pattern of demand for funding against
the two collateral sets (and by extension, changes in market
conditions).  This removes the need for the Bank to make a
decision before each auction on the appropriate split of
funding to provide.  The Bank will also be able to use the bids
in successive auctions to consider changes in funding market
conditions, and hence to inform the appropriate size of
subsequent auctions.  This was not possible in the previous
extended-collateral long-term repo operations, in which the
Bank imposed a restriction on bids against wider collateral
being at least 50 basis points above the minimum bid rate for
narrow collateral.
Operational features
A new feature of the revised auctions is that bids will be
indexed to Bank Rate;  ie the rate paid by counterparties will
be explicitly linked to the actual level of Bank Rate over the life
of the repo.  Hence bids will be submitted as a spread over
Bank Rate.  This will allow counterparties to participate
without having to take a view on the future path of Bank Rate.
And unlike previous long-  term repo operations, the new
indexed auctions will be on a so-called uniform-price format.
This means that every successful bidder on a given collateral
set pays the same price, which is the lowest accepted rate (the
clearing rate) for that collateral set.  This should mean that
participants face little incentive to alter their bids based on
assumptions about other participants’ likely behaviour.
Another new feature in the auctions will be the option for
participants to submit ‘paired bids’, consisting of a single
nominal amount and two spreads at which the counterparty is
willing to borrow against the delivery of narrow and wider
collateral respectively.  This gives participants two
opportunities to raise a specific quantity of funds while
avoiding the risk of being allocated more than they need
(which could happen if two separate bids for the same nominal
amount were successful).  If both sides of a paired bid are
successful, the participant will be allotted against the bid
which offers them better value (ie the bid with the highest
spread relative to the clearing spread for that collateral type).
The new long-term repos will be offered initially once per
month, with two operations with a three-month maturity and
one with a six-month maturity in each calendar quarter.  The
overall stock of funds available will be reviewed regularly in
light of prevailing financial market conditions and the level of
demand at previous auctions.
(1) See The Development of the Bank of England’s Market Operations at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/publications/condococt08.pdf.
(2) The Bank would like to thank Professor Paul Klemperer of Nuffield College, Oxford
University for his contributions and advice on design issues for the new auctions.
(3) To ensure consistency across the Bank’s sterling operations, the wider collateral set
will initially be aligned closely with Collateral Level B for the Discount Window
Facility.
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Chart A Percentage allocated to wider collateral set in
stressed and non-stressed conditions